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Abstract
This paper examined the changes in employment in industries with close ties to
sugary products sales following an increase in sugar tax in Norway in January 2018.
Using the data from Statistics Norway and having removed seasonality, interrupted
time series analysis was conducted. Data on food manufacture, beverage manufac-
ture as well as wholesale and retail trade excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles
was studied. Additional analysis was conducted for robustness specifications. The
paper discovered a small and negative, statistically significant intercept change in
employment in wholesale trade sector. This could be indicating some short-term
effects of the increased sugar tax. Evidence from beverages manufacturing sector
show a significant and positive post-tax trend change. This could indicate some
long-term effects. Wholesale trade sector experienced a decrease in the number of
people employed. The beverages sector witnessed an increase in the employment
level after the tax was increased. No other significant effects were discovered with
the available data. Robustness tests failed to confirm the validity of the results.
Warranty with respect to the outcomes must be taken. It is unlikely that the
employment changes found in the paper were caused by an increased sugar tax.
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1 Introduction
This section offers an overview of the topic and states the scope of the study.
Most of the countries strive to obtain high employment and attempt to achieve this
goal by the means of fiscal or monetary policy. Usually, expansive fiscal policy is or-
chestrated by a government to decrease unemployment (Tragakes, 2011). This implies
eliminating or decreasing taxes and increasing government spending. An example of ex-
pansive fiscal policy aiming at higher employment is decreasing sales taxes such as taxes
on sugar. Alongside having employment goals, a large number of countries also have
well-being goals and attempt to limit the consumption of demerit goods in favour of its
citizens. Sugary products have long been known to cause long- and short-term damage
to its consumers (Brownell et al., 2009; Escobar et al., 2013; Ludwig et al., 2001; Thow et
al., 2014; World Health Organization, 2017). Levying additional health taxes on sugar or
sugar-rich products is designed to boost the well-being of citizens. There is some evidence
of that sugar taxes are successful in decreasing consumption of sugary products (Escobar
et al., 2013; Thow et al., 2014), but these health taxation schemes have often been ac-
cused of threatening domestic producers, harming the poorest consumers and increasing
general unemployment (NTB, 2018). This leads to a trade-off policymakers face between
pursuing higher employment levels or improved well-being of the society. During the last
decade, France, Finland, Hungary, Great Britain, Mexico and several states of the USA
decided to focus on the well-being of the society and introduced some form of a sugar tax
(Wright et al., 2017). Norway specifically increased the already high sugar tax in January
2018 (Finansdepartementet, 2017).
The issue of sugar taxation has been addressed relatively early in Norway compared
to other European countries. A sugar tax was first introduced in 1922 and was designed
to primarily generate revenue to the government. In recent decades, the aim of sugar
taxation has been attributed to a nation-wide health-promoting package by the means of
which the Norwegian government attempts to reduce the consumption of sugary prod-
ucts, especially soft drinks and chocolate confectionery (Nieburg, 2018; Tisdall, 2007).
The economic rationale behind the Norwegian sugar tax is to discourage consumption of
potentially harmful sugary products and to raise revenue to compensate for the incor-
rectly signalled costs to the society. An excise tax is a type of selective sales tax levied
on certain kind of consumption activity (Rosen, 2004). Because sugar as an input is too
cheap, the price of sugary products is too low from the societal perspective. To raise
the price and equate social and private costs, Pigou (2017) designed a kind of excise
tax called pigouvian tax. By taxing sugar, the quantity demanded of sugary products
should decrease. The decline in quantity demanded of the sugar products can induce a
lower production level which translates into a decrease in employment in that part of the
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economy. This can cause a general rise in unemployment if old employees don’t find new
jobs or leave the labour market (Hyman, 2011; Rosen, 2004).
Sugar taxes, as an example of externality taxation, have primarily been studied within
the fields of medicine and health economics. Distribution effects, as well as wellness out-
comes connected with sugar taxes, have been given some attention but fewer studies have
been conducted on the employment effects of such a tax. Moreover, the existing studies
considered almost exclusively Mexico and the USA. Thus, the majority of macroeconomic
notions connected with the European health taxes haven’t been thoroughly studied. The
aim of this paper is to explore the economic trade-off between high employment and
well-being of the society by answering the following research question:
Is there a significant change in employment in selected industries following
an increase in sugar tax in January 2018?
By looking at the employment change following a higher tax on sugar in industries
with close ties to sugar and sugary products sales, the causality between unemployment
and health taxes will be examined. In order to achieve this, employment in food and
beverage manufacturing sectors, wholesale and retail trade without motor vehicles and
motorcycles will be analysed using interrupted time series analysis (ITSA). This paper is
going to add to the extensive research focused on the cost-benefit analysis of sugar taxes
by specifically addressing the employment effect of the increased sugar tax in Norway.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 explains the theory behind the economics
of the issue of sugar tax in Norway and the existing literature on the subject. Section
3 accounts for the data collection strategy. In section 4 applied empirical estimation is
presented and in section 5 the results of the paper are summarised. The robustness tests
and validity can be found in section 6. The discussion of ITSA results is located in section
7. Number 8, the last section, concludes the paper and suggests future research.
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2 Background
In this section an overview of relevant literature and theoretical framework are being
presented.
2.1 Theoretical framework
After January 2018 a 37.32 Norwegian crowns (NEK) per kg tax was levied on sugary
products, see Figure 1. The economic model of demand and supply predicts that on a
competitive market increasing the price of a product, by subjecting it to a tax, will lead to
a decrease in the quantity demanded of that product, ceteris paribus. On the Norwegian
market, a supply shock caused by the increase in sugary products prices due to a higher tax
will move the supply curve upwards. Subsequently, higher consumer prices will discourage
consumption of the now more expensive sugar or sugary products. The consumers might
switch to imports or substitutes as long as these are cheaper (Tragakes, 2011). On the
assumption that sugary products and sugar are responsive to changes in prices, consumers
will react to a higher tax and by a chain reaction narrow the employment possibilities
available in the industries producing mainly the sugary products (Rosen, 2004).
Figure 1: Visual depiction of the effect of an increased sugar tax on the Norwegian sugary
products market, demand remaining unchanged.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The initial equilibrium is depicted at letter A
where the price is P1 and quantity Q1. When the new taxation scheme becomes enacted,
production costs become higher. The supply curve shifts to the left from S1 to S2 and
the average sugary product prices increase to P2, causing lower quantity demanded Q2.
Vertical distance AC shows the new tax. A post-tax optimum lies at a higher price and
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lower quantity demanded depicted by letter B. With the demand remaining unchanged,
the shift in supply stimulates less domestic production. Hu (2002) explains that under
plausible assumptions, a decrease in quantity demanded translates in large part into a
decrease in production. Norwegian firms specialising in providing sugary products would
lay off workers, contributing to lower employment.
2.2 Literature
Studies such as the paper published by Neslin and Shoemaker (1983) confirm that
sugary products are normal goods and that their demand should respond to changes in
price, even if manufactured sugar products are more responsive to changes in prices than
sugar as a raw commodity is (Tragakes, 2011). Using a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System model or QUAIDS 1 Guerrero-Lo´pez et al. (2017b) estimated price elasticity of
sugary drinks to be about -1.37 and sweet snacks to be around -1.21, using data on
consumption from surveys conducted in Chile. Another study performed using a Linear
Approximation of Almost Ideal Demand Systems, or LA/AIDS 2 in Mexico found similar
results, estimating own price elasticity to be -1.06 and -0.97 for sugary drinks and sweet
snacks respectively (Colchero et al., 2015). These empirical results are consistent with
the economic reasoning behind Figure 1 and indicate that the domestic market for sugary
products in Norway should react in a predictable way, subsequently causing some increase
in unemployment.
A serious concern about the employment consequences of increasing sales taxes in
Noway was summarised in a general form by Hyman (2011) in the following statement:
”A possible effect of local sales taxation is a loss of retail trade to neighbouring
jurisdictions where the sales tax is either absent or applied at a lower rate.
The migration of retail sales to another taxing jurisdiction can have the effect
of reducing employment, business profits in the taxing jurisdiction, or both.”
Health taxation, like any other taxation, can be a source of economic tradeoffs. Hyman
(2011) points out that taxing a product might lead to a local decrease in sales and
subsequent unemployment. On the foreign market, the price of sugary products will be
relatively lower than the Norwegian prices and can lead to a migration of retail sales to
foreign tax jurisdictions. Just as Hyman (2011) reasons, Sweden, which didn’t implement
any sugar tax, attracted Norwegian customers who were willing to buy cheaper sugary
foods. This was experienced by a number of Swedish and Norwegian business owners
located near the border between the two countries, both of whom noticed an increase in
1Almost Ideal Demand Systems approximates consumer demand systems that are non-linear. The
model is based on cost/expenditure function and in this case, adds a quadratic expenditure term to the
equation.
2Linear Almost Ideal Demand System model uses the same analysis as QUAIDS with the exception
of applying a linear expenditure term instead of quadratic.
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border trade after January 2018 (Bloch-Budzier, 2018; Criscone, 2018). However, taking
into account that Norwegian demand is much smaller than the Swedish demand, the
effect on Swedish prices and Swedish demand would be negligible. This issue won’t be
explored in this paper.
Assuming that decrease in quantity demanded translates fully into a decrease in pro-
duction, unemployment surge can follow the 2018 increase in Norwegian sugar tax (Hu,
2002). An expected decrease in employment has been used by many opponents of health
taxes (Alan, 2015; Armstrong, 2016; Genever, 2016). Meanwhile, most of the existing
empirical studies on the subject point towards another conclusion. For example, Powell
et al. (2014) looked at 2012 tax reform in Illinois and California when the sugar-sweetened
beverages (SSB) became taxable at 20% rate. The research was conducted using macroe-
conomic simulation REMI3 model and accounted for both private and public sector. Pow-
ell et al. (2014) found that almost no net employment changes occurred in both states
(0.06% in Illinois and 0.03% in California) following new taxation scheme. These results
don’t support the theoretical economic framework summarised by Hyman (2011).
Generally, the effect of pigouvian health taxes has been more thoroughly studied using
the example of alcohol and cigarettes consumption. These studies can be useful in evalu-
ating the effects of sugar taxation on employment on the assumption that sugary products
are demerit goods in the same fashion alcohol beverages and tobacco are. Demerit goods
are goods that the society considers undesirable for its citizens but that would be overpro-
vided by free markets in the absence of government regulation (Tragakes, 2011). Sugar
can be considered a demerit good for a number of reasons. Due to its addictive qualities,
it will be easy to sell and over-provide on an unregulated market. Sugar is a cheap and
energy dense ingredient added to the majority of food products. Most people aren’t being
aware of the health costs involved in the consumption of these goods, as evidenced by the
wave of obesity-related hospital admissions in recent years (Griffith et al., 2016; World
Health Organization, 2017). Using alcohol consumption in the USA as an example of
a health tax employment effects, Wada et al. (2017) used REMI estimation to look at
causality between health taxes and unemployment. In the analysis, the authors showed
that increasing the excise tax on alcohol with 5% would decrease net employment in
gross term but not in net terms, as there would be an overall employment gain due to job
creation thanks to the reallocation of resources. This confirms the results from Powell et
al. (2014) who also points out that the net employment effects of a health tax are almost
nonexistent despite a substantial decrease in gross employment in the affected industries.
In addition to that, evidence from tobacco studies further contradicts the hypothe-
sis stating that there is an employment loss following a positive change in a health tax.
3REMI is a dynamic simulation of the effects of a policy on several sectors based on their performance
and interaction with each other. The sectors included output, labour and capital demand, demographics,
market shares and wages, prices and costs.
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Building upon different published estimates of price elasticity of tobacco, Godfrey and
Maynard (1988) predict direct and indirect reductions in employment in the British to-
bacco industry. The authors estimate that a 10% increase in tobacco tax each year could
result in 3700 fewer jobs in the British tobacco industry but acknowledge that the net
effect for the economy as a whole can be negligible due to job creation in other sectors.
Most importantly, shifts in demand and labour requirements associated with the two
different patterns of consumption will determine how the net employment change would
realise.
Finally, by looking at the Mexican manufacturing industry, commercial sector and
general unemployment rate, Guerrero-Lo´pez et al. (2017a) found that net unemployment
remains unchanged after the introduction of 2014 tax schedule on unhealthy foods due to
offsetting job creation in different sectors. This recent paper inspired the current work as
it used ITSA to evaluate the changes in employment in relevant industries and produced
results highly consistent with REMI estimations.
Altogether, the current state of research shows that there is substantial empirical
evidence contradicting the macroeconomic theory of health taxes contribution to an em-
ployment decrease.
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3 Data
In this section sources of information and variables are being described.
All of the numerical data comes from Statistisk Sentralbyr˚a - Statistics Norway.
Statistics Norway is the official Norwegian institution for data collection and publish-
ing. StatBank is a public tool available on the Statistics Norway website and allows for
customised data extraction. The quarterly data on employment and unemployment in
relevant sectors had been generated using StatBank. This paper uses data on industry
employment between January 2016 and September 2018 by the end of each quarter. Na-
tional unemployment shows the number of registered unemployed between January 2015
and September 2018 by the end of each quarter.
Industrial division of the employees in StatBank has been made according to SIC2007,
an industrial classification system adopted by Statistics Norway in 2011. SIC2007 does
not provide industrial classification below four digits, which means that there is some
limitation to the relevance of the data used in the paper. However, because of the
significant time and resource scarcity, a simplification had to been made where the lowest
available industrial division from StatBank is used as a proxy for the underlying trends
and changes on a more detailed, specific and unavailable industrial sectors (Gimming et
al., 2011).
In this analysis, four sectors are being identified as relevant based on the groups
selected by Guerrero-Lo´pez et al. (2017a). Food products manufacture, beverages manu-
facture, wholesale trade and retail trade (excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles) are
being specifically studied under the assumption of being reasonably informative about
the true employment sensitivity to changes in prices of sugar and sugary products.
On the industrial level, data on employment in wholesale trade and retail trade are
considered to be directly connected to the sales of sugar. At the same time, not all of
the wholesale and retail trade sectors can be connected to sugar and sugary products.
For example, wholesalers of other commodities such as wood or textiles wouldn’t have
been affected by a change in the prices of sugar. SIC2007 allows only for exclusion of
employees from companies occupied with motor vehicles and motorcycles. Since these are
considered to remain unaffected by any sugar taxes, the numbers on wholesale and retail
trade employment excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles had been used throughout
the analysis. This attempts to give a clearer picture of the effects of the change in sugar
tax. A large number of wholesalers depend on sugar as an unprocessed commodity that
is sold to manufacturing companies. Moreover, several major product groups such as
confectionery, sugary beverages and candy, characterised by high sugar content, are often
sold to smaller trade units such as supermarkets, local stores and kiosks. The retailers
in turn sell sugary drinks, candy and other sugar products directly to consumers and
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have to bear the impact of higher purchase prices. On the assumption that a change in
sales translates outright into a change in production and an adjustment of the number of
employees, the two groups can be expected to react to a higher sugar tax (Hu, 2002).
Furthermore, a large share of manufacturers within food products and beverages sector
is dependent on sugar as an important ingredient. The paper assumes that employment in
the two sectors can be used as a sensible proxy for changes in employment that vary with
the tax levels on sugar. As Table 1 shows, the greatest price change occurred in the sugary-
products sector which faced almost a doubling of the prices of sugar-processed products
in 2018 (Finansdepartementet, 2017). After January 2018, general sugar-containing food
products faced an 83% increased sugar tax level and all the beverages, either naturally
or artificially sweetened, faced a 43% increase in sugar tax level. Beverages such as beer,
soft drinks, juice and coffee rely heavily on added sugar as a raw ingredient. Increasing
the tax in all Norway in January 2018 should affect this sector as well. This paper makes
the crucial assumption that all sugary products should react to prices changing as a result
of the increase in the level of tax on sugar.
Using the data on national unemployment, the overall trend in the number of people
engaged in Norwegian economy is being controlled for. Comparing the direction of the
effect in the analysed industries to the effect on the national unemployment as a whole
can help in evaluating the internal validity of the results.
Table 1: A Table showing the development of tax on sugar and processed sugary products
in Norway across the recent years (Finansdepartementet, 2017).
Year tax per kg of sugar (NEK) tax per kg of sugary products (NEK)
2012 7.05 18.21
2013 7.18 18.56
2014 7.32 19.31
2015 7.49 19.31
2016 7.66 20.19
2017 7.81 20.19
2018 7.93 37.32
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4 Methods
This section addresses methodology of the empirical estimation used in the analysis.
This paper uses interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) to evaluate the effect a higher
tax on sugar has on employment in Norway.
ITSA is a study design optimal for situations when a government intervention (used as
treatment) has been implemented at a given point in time to a certain population (used
as treatment and control group). On the national level, random assignment of treatment
proves often too difficult or impossible to obtain. Using ITSA allows for isolating pre- and
post-treatment trends in order to compare them and obtain the effect of treatment. The
design has been discussed in more detail by Biglan et al. (2000); Linden and Arbor (2015);
Penfold and Zhang (2013); Wagner et al. (2002); Wang et al. (2013). The principle of an
ITSA study is establishing a trend pre- and post-intervention for the same group with a
discontinuity at the time of the intervention. Using the hypothetical development of the
pre-intervention trend as a control group, or counterfactual group, the potential effect of
the treatment is evaluated.
For the evaluation of the Norwegian policy change, the paper assumes the increase in
the tax on sugar as intervention and Norwegian labour force in different sectors as treated
population. ITSA design can be seen as appropriate for the following reasons:
• the timing of the sugar tax policy change is clearly defined by Finansdepartementet
(2017) to be the first of January 2018. This provides a well-defined pre-treatment
period (years before 2018) and post-treatment period (year 2018 and onward).
• the outcome of the policy change can be relatively quick to realise as employment
in the concerned sectors of the economy is responsive to changes in product prices,
as documented by previous empirical studies in Colchero et al. (2015); Guerrero-
Lo´pez et al. (2017b). Moreover, in Norway, the average dismissal time for a worker is
one month, unless stated otherwise (The Norwegian Directorate of Integration and
Diversity, 2019). This means that if production levels change, employment levels
can be adjusted soon after the decisions were been implemented and the effects will
be visible quickly.
• the data requirement is sufficiently satisfied by the employment statistics from
across industries over time, available from Statistics Norway. Wagner et al. (2002)
points out however that evaluating the results of an ITSA with a limited number
of data points must be very careful. This remark is discussed in section 7 of this
paper.
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With just one group under observation, ITSA framework has been summarised by
Linden and Arbor (2015) in the following segmented regression:
Yt = β0 + β1T + β2Xt + β3XtT +
∑
k
µkZkt + t (1)
where:
Yt is defined as the outcome variable,
T is defined as the time trend variable
Xt is defined as the treatment dummy, where Xt = 1 when the higher tax was in place
and Xt = 0 before that
XtT is defined as the interaction term between the dummy activated at the beginning
of the treatment period and the time trend variable. In the analysis conducted in this
paper, XtT = Xt(T − 8) or Xt(T−start of the treatment period)
Zkt is defined as control explanatory variables included in the model
t is defined as the error term
β0 is defined as the baseline intercept for the control group when T=0
β1 is defined as the pre-tax time trend
β2 represents the change in the intercept of the outcome variable after the higher tax was
implemented
β3 represents the change in the slope of the regression line after the higher tax was im-
plemented
µk represents other k parameters associated with control variables in the model measured
in t periods
Equation 1 produces a regression function such as in Figure 2, where dependent vari-
able is a function of time. The vertical, dotted line depicts the treatment time, or January
2018 when the higher sugar tax was implemented. The initial intercept of the Function 1,
β0, is the value of employment in a chosen sector before the tax was increased. The line
to the left of the threshold has a slope of β1 and represents the trend in absence of tax
changes (pre-tax trend). Change in taxation level shifts the intercept of the function to
β2 and the change in trend is equal to β3. A change in the intercept implies an immediate
effect of the intervention or a short-term effect of a higher sugar tax. The new post-tax
trend, depicted by the line to the right of the cutoff, has a slope of β1+β3. A change in
slopes implies a long-term effect where β3 allows for assessment of the sustainability of
the effect the treatment had (Wang et al., 2013).
In the segmented regression, no control variables were used. The error term t, also
referred to as disturbance term, contains the unobserved variables. These could have
also affected employment in different sectors at the time a higher tax was introduced but
weren’t included into the regression.
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Dependent  
variable
Time 
Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
β0 
β1 (T) 
β2 (X) 
β1 (X) + β3 (XT) 
Figure 2: Visual depiction of a single group ITSA.
For employment in each sector, a separate analysis was conducted. Each analysis
produced a different regression function, where the outcome variable was employment in
food products manufacturing, beverages manufacturing, wholesale and retail sales trade
respectively. Additional regression such that the outcome variable is national unemploy-
ment was conducted as well to control for underlying nation-wide trends. As a result, 5
different outcome variables were used in total, each with a separate ITSA regression.
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In ITSA, the problems characteristic for time series can confound the value of true es-
timates. Seasonality, autocorrelation and trending variables are the most serious method-
ological issues (Penfold and Zhang, 2013; Wagner et al., 2002).
1. Trending variables. A time series exhibits trending variable if there is a general
increase or decrease in the series throughout the sample (Verbeek, 2008, chap.4).
Employment usually fluctuates with time and does not display any consistent time
trends. In order to account for eventual time trend, the time variable with coefficient
β1 has been included into each ITSA as a part of the research design in Equation
(1).
2. Seasonality. Seasonal patterns is defined as any pattern in the data that repeats
itself over known, fixed periods. Quarterly data can produce biased coefficients if
seasonality is present due to various factors. For example, employment can increase
in summer quarter due to warm weather that stimulates beverage sales and persists
over the years in a repetitive form. Using deseasonalised data as a dependent vari-
able in the respective regressions accounts for the seasonality by using the variation
in the data independent of seasonal effects.
3. Autocorrelation. For time series data, values of the same variable in different time
periods can be intercross-dependent on each other across time. It is referred to
as autocorrelation. Time variables have a tendency to repeat themselves - if un-
employment in a sector of an economy was on the rise in the past, there is some
nonzero probability that it is going to continue to rise in time periods that follow.
If variables in the regression are highly persistent, coefficient estimates would be
inconsistent (Verbeek, 2008).
Several countermeasures are being accounted for with regard to the autocorrelation
of the data. This paper will look at correlograms, autocorrelation of the process and
Durbin-Watson statistic in order to account for the issue. Correlograms plot sample
autocorrelations of a variable against its time lags in order to check for randomness,
trends and seasonal patterns. Plotting correlograms gives an idea of how serious an issue
autocorrelation is. Data on each dependent variable has been used to create different
correlograms which can be found in the appendix section A.
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Another way of looking at autocorrelation of variables is to look at their autoregression
of the process lag 1, or AR1. Estimating correlation between a variable and its first lag
indicates how much of the variation within the variable can be explained by its one-
period delayed copy. To perform AR1, the following equation can be estimated according
to Verbeek (2008):
Yt = δ1Yt−1 + θt (2)
where:
Yt is defined as the outcome variable in time t
Yt−1 is defined as the time trend variable one period before t
δ1 is defined as a constant
θt is defined as an error term
A variable is assumed to be highly persistent if δ1 coefficient is close to 1 or -1. High
values of δ1 indicate that variables aren’t stationary and that autocorrelation might be an
issue. In this paper, variables so that δ1 /∈ [−0.8,0.8] are assumed to be highly persistent
and potentially cause the estimators to be inconsistent. Variables with δ1 ∈ [−0.8,0.8],
or closer to zero, are considered to be weakly dependent and safe to use. The exact
thresholds of the interval however vary dependent on the researcher and their field of
study.
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic tests the null hypothesis that the residuals aren’t au-
tocorrelated against the alternative that the residuals follow an AR1 process according
to Equation (2). The DW statistic takes on values between 0 and 4. A value realised
close to 2 indicates no autocorrelation; a value between 0 and 2 indicates positive au-
tocorrelation; a value between 2 and 4 indicates negative autocorrelation (Linden and
Arbor, 2015). No general rule has been established for the threshold indicating serious
autocorrelation. Typically, DW statistics realising between 1.5 and 2.5 is assumed to be
no source of autocorrelation concern. This rule of thumb is going to be used in the next
section to control for autocorrelation of dependent variables.
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5 Results
In this part of the paper main results of the empirical study are presented. The sig-
nificance level is assumed to be α = 0.05 throughout the rest of the paper.
5.1 Autocorrelation
Correlograms for food products, beverages, wholesale and retail trade had been ob-
tained and can be found in the Appendix section A. All four correlograms of employment
in the analysed sectors highlighted some autocorrelation at lag one (AR1) and two (AR2)
so the analysis was adjusted to allow for autocorrelation up to the second lag. National
unemployment data exhibits strong autocorrelation at lag 1, which is why a lagged de-
pendent variable was included into ITSA regression as a control variable.
To further investigate the issue of autocorrelation, the autocorrelation of the process
was looked at as well as Durbin-Watson statistic included as a formal test for autocorre-
lation.
Table 2: The results of the autocorrelation of the process and Durbin-Watson
statistic for autocorrelation of dependent variables.
outcome variable Yt : AR1 (δ1) Durbin-Watson statistic
employment in food products sector 0.1381 1.611454
employment in beverage sector 0.1892 2.379067
employment in wholesale trade 0.4469 1.545292
employment in retail trade 0.1044 1.651352
national unemployment -0.1688 0.775285
Source: author’s estimations done using Stata 13. Command dwstat was used for Durbin-Watson test
statistics and corr var L.var for AR1, according to Equation (2).
As shown in Table 2, most of the data on dependent variables were found to be weakly
dependent based on the obtained coefficients in autoregressive models order one (AR1).
Employment in the wholesale trade sector exhibits higher δ1 but the value is within the
threshold accepted in this paper.
The DW statistics are summarised to the right of AR1 values for all the detrended
dependent variables. Based on the results for industry data, ITSA allowed for lag 2 of the
employment in different sectors to correct for autocorrelation. In the analysis of national
unemployment data, the command was allowed to control for lag 3 and one-period lagged
dependent variable was used as explanatory variable.
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5.2 Employment in the food sector & in the beverages sector
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(a) Employees in food manufacturing sector in
Norway since January 2016.
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(b) Employees in beverage manufacturing sec-
tor in Norway since January 2016.
Figure 3: Data on employment in food products and beverage manufacturing
sectors before and after January 2018.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway.
The quarterly number of employees in Norway between January 2016 and September
2018 are shown in Figures 3a for the food sector and 3b for the beverages sector. The
vertical line at the eight month represents the time at which the treatment, a higher tax
rate on sugar, was implemented. The data looks like there is is some seasonality pattern
in both Figures. To formally test for seasonality a joint significance test was conduced on
quarterly dummies. The evidence suggested that both food sector and beverage sector
data exhibits seasonality. Subsequently, the seasonal variation was accounted for in the
ITSA regression.
Having tested for autocorrelation of the dependent variables and seasonality, ITSA
has been conducted. Figure 4a shows the data on food products sector where seasonality
has been corrected for and the obtained data plotted against time. The graph shows
clearly that ITSA fitted an increasing linear trend before the tax was introduced and a
subsequent decreasing linear trend. There seems to be a change in slopes before and after
the sugar tax was increased. Almost no change in the intercept can be seen in the Figure
4a.
The analysis conducted using the data on employment in beverages manufacturing
sector produced Figure 4b. In this industry, just like in the graph showing the food prod-
ucts sector, the trends in employment seems to have changed direction after the treatment
period. After January 2018, there seems to be an upward trend in the employment. Be-
fore the tax was introduced, the trend was declining. This can be seen clearly around
the dotted vertical lines, where a linear trend produced with deseasonalised data turns
around after the ninth quarter.
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tor in Norway since January 2016.
Figure 4: ITSA conduced with deseasonalised data on employment in food
products and beverage manufacturing sectors.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway.
Table 3: Estimated changes in employment in food and beverage sectors of
Norwegian economy before and after sugar tax was increased
Employment in Food Products Employment in Beverages
outcome variable Yt coefficient (95% CI) p-value coefficient (95% CI) p-value
intercept β0 45854.69 0.000 3489.438 0.000
(45459.73;46249.65) (3411.936;3566.939)
pre-tax trend β1 95.5625 0.028 -22.1875 0.001
(17.28982;173.8352) (-29.43327;-14.94173)
intercept change β2 23.875 0.924 -23.875 0.177
(-626.6852 ;674.4352) (-64.33576;16.58576)
post-tax trend change β3 -117.25 0.458 54 0.002
(-514.2719;279.7719) (33.47509;74.52491)
post tax trend β1+ β3 -21.6875 0.8842 31.8125 0.0142
(-409.7821;366.4071) (10.5725;53.0525)
Source: author’s estimations done using Stata 13.
Table 3 presents the results of ITSA regression (depicted in Figures 4a, 4b), where
deseasonalised data was used.
Analysis conducted using data on employment in food products manufacturing sector
found no significant difference in trends before and after the treatment period. The post-
treatment trend, represented by β1+β3, isn’t statistically significant. A higher tax rate on
sugar hasn’t been found to produce any long-term changes. Intercept change, represented
by β2, isn’t statistically significant either. There is not enough evidence to claim that a
change in tax produced any immediate effects on employment in food manufacturing.
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The results of the analysis conducted using the data on employment in beverages
manufacturing sector can be seen in Figure 4b. The data exhibits less of a seasonal
pattern than food products employment and no clear time trend. In this industry, the
trends in employment seems to have changed direction after the treatment period - after
January 2018, there seems to be an upward trend in the employment. Before the tax was
introduced, the trend was declining. This can be seen more clearly around ninth quarter
in Figure 4b, where a linear trend produced with deseasonalised data turns around and
becomes positive. Short-term employment changes in the beverages manufacturing sector
aren’t statistically significant, as documented by a high p-value of β2. There seems to
be some long-term effect of the higher sugar tax rate, documented by a statistically
significant post-tax trend represented by β1 + β3. The change in slope, β3, is positive
and equal to 54. This means that on average, the change in employment in the beverages
sector associated with each quarter after the tax was raised was 54 employees more than
before the tax was changed. Seen in the context of Norwegian employment statistics,
54 employees correspond to less than 1.5% of the average employment in the beverages
manufacturing sector in 2018. This is a small number but what is most surprising is that
the direction of the employment trend changed after the tax was raised. Possible reasons
for this will be explained in the next section.
The findings above imply that there is little evidence of that the 2018 change in sugar
tax had any effect on employment in the food sector in Norway. Beverages manufacture
could experience some positive long-term effects of a higher sugar tax. However, due to
data scarcity on post-tax employment, further studies are needed to confirm this result.
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5.3 Employment in the wholesale trade sector & retail trade
sector
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(a) Employees in the wholesale trade sector in
Norway since January 2016.
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January 2016.
Figure 5: ITSA showing the deseasonalised regression of data on employment in
wholesale and retail trade sectors before and after the sugar tax was increased.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway.
Figures 5a and 5b depict the statistics on the number of employees working in the
wholesale trade sector and retail trade sector respectively since January 2016. The vertical
line at the eights month represents the time at which the treatment, a higher tax rate
on sugar, was implemented. Employment in both figures seems to exhibit some kind of
seasonality, where the largest number of employees appears to have been registered in the
middle of each year. This can be seen by tracing the data points on the graphs.
Having tested for autocorrelation of the dependent variables and seasonality, ITSA
has been conducted. Figure 6a illustrates steeply increasing trends in employment in
wholesale trade before and after the treatment. Figure 6b seems to present declining,
flatter time trends in employment in retail trade sector both before and after the sugar tax
was increased. Both sectors seem to have experienced a change in employment following
the introduction of the higher sugar tax, but the graphs themselves can’t reveal whether
the changes were statistically significant.
20
10
10
00
10
15
00
10
20
00
10
25
00
10
30
00
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
time (quarters)
Predicted values Regression line
Regression with Newey−West standard errors − lag(2)
Wholesale trade sector
(a) Deseasonalised data on employees in whole-
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Figure 6: ITSA showing the residuals from deseasonalised regression of em-
ployment in wholesale and retail trade sectors before and after the sugar tax
was increased.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway. Both graphs were constructed
using ITSA command in Stata 13.
Table 4: Estimated changes in employment in wholesale and retail trade sectors
of Norwegian economy before and after sugar tax was increased.
Employment in Wholesale trade Employment in Retail trade
dependent variable Yt coefficient (95% CI) p-value coefficient (95% CI) p-value
intercept β0 100895.9 0.000 199699.7 0.000
(100099;101692.8) (198898;200501.4)
pre-tax trend β1 278.8127 0.006 -62.93713 0.433
(111.4353;446.1901) (-241.7729;115.8986)
intercept change β2 -791.9598 0.038 -198.128 0.601
(-1524.95;-58.96958) (-1053.281;657.0253)
post-tax trend change β3 -77.75019 0.561 -193.7504 0.445
(-379.2539;223.7535) (-759.3963;371.8956)
post tax trend β1+ β3 201.0625 0.0617 -256.6875 0.2368
(-12.9548;415.0798) (-725.8934;212.5184)
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway.
Table 4 presents the results of ITSA regression with deseasonalised data. In the
wholesale trade sector, the employment data produced a large, statistically significant
coefficients of pre-tax trend and a smaller, statistically insignificant post-tax trend. The
short term change indicator, β2, is statistically significant and equal to -791.9598. This
means that according to the evidence presented above, immediately after the higher tax
was introduced, the wholesale trade sector employed about 792 people less than before
2018. In the context of the whole sector, this corresponds to less than 1% of the average
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number of worker. This change can be seen as small, and temporary, as documented by
insignificant long term indicator, β1 + β3. Therefore there isn’t enough evidence to claim
that the 2018 change in tax had any long term effect on employment in wholesale trade
sector in Norway. However, some short term changes could have been discovered. At the
same time, due to data scarcity on employment after January 2018, further studies are
needed to confirm the results.
The data containing employment statistics for the retail trade sector didn’t produce
any statistically significant coefficients. Intercept change and post-tax trend were both
found to be insignificant. These results suggest that there isn’t enough evidence to claim
that the 2018 change in tax had any short- or long-term effect on employment in retail
trade sector in Norway.
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6 Validity of the results
This section presents the robustness tests conducted in this paper as well as discusess
external and internal validity of the results.
External validity refers to the extent to which the results can be generalised and used
by other communities. Other academic work concerned with the same subject, such as
Guerrero-Lo´pez et al. (2017a); Powell et al. (2014), produced results partly similar to
the results presented in this paper. Neither Mexican nor Norwegian sugar taxes seem
to cause lower employment in the majority of sugar-dependent industries. International
experience on alcohol and tobacco taxes, exemplified by Godfrey and Maynard (1988); Hu
(2002); Wada et al. (2017), show more variation in their findings. A reason for this might
be that the employment sector connected to tobacco or alcohol differ more significantly
from sugary products and has a greater capacity to withstand increased raw material
prices.
Internal validity refers to how accurate the results are and whether the observed
results are caused by an independent variable or some other confounding factor. The
confounding factor can be compared to an omitted variable bias when an important
explanatory variable is included into the error term.
Robustness tests do not add any information on causality in question but they are
helpful in discovering omitted variables that could have confounded the results from
the conducted ITSA. In order to test the correctness of the results, different kinds of
robustness analysis were conducted: a pseudo-intervention test, a time trend specification
test and an analysis of national unemployment.
6.1 Pseudo-intervention robustness test
Empirical models with regression discontinuity such as ITSA widely apply a simple
yet effective robustness check called pseudo-intervention regressing. While performing a
pseudo-intervention on ITSA, the treatment time was altered to an earlier period than
the period during which the real treatment took place. The robustness test looked for sta-
tistically significant intercept change or post-tax trend change in the pseudo-intervention
regressions. If any of these were found to be significant, then ”any significant changes in
the outcome of the true treatment unit cannot be attributed to the intervention” (Linden,
2018).
Using the original regression according to Equation (1), the robustness checking re-
gression set Xt to be the treatment dummy equal to one a year before the actual higher
tax was in place (to January 2017) and zero before that. The year 2017 was used because
it contains data on employment closest to the analysed date. There is a chance that
some trends which continued throughout 2018 did already exist by 2017. This would
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make the conditions of pseudo-intervention as similar to the real intervention as possible.
The results of the robustness analysis can be found in the first column of the Table 6
located in the Appendix section C. For data on food products manufacturing employ-
ment, the pseudo-intervention produced significant intercept change and post-tax trend
coefficients. The post-tax trend was also found to be significant in beverage employment
and retail sales employment data. This implies that the internal validity of the results is
questionable.
6.2 Time trend specification robustness test
Robustness testing is also used to look at how the conclusions of an analysis change
when the underlying assumptions are altered. Applying the correct specification of the
regression equation is one of the crucial assumptions of the ITSA model. If regression
form was misspecified, the obtained coefficients will be biased (Verbeek, 2008). To further
investigate the issue of validity of the results, the assumption of linearity of the time
trend was tested against a hypothetical quadratic or cubic time trend. In order to do that
additional regressions were conducted. Since the original regression uses the assumption of
a linear time trend, conducting the analysis according to the Equations 3 and 4 produced
coefficients that can be informative about the robustness of the original results.
The original results of regression according to Equation 1 are presented in Tables 3 and
4. Coefficients obtained with regressions according to Equations 4 and 3 are summarised
in the Appendix C, in Table 6. Second column to the right in Table 6 contains the results
of adding a quadratic term to the original regression according to the following :
Yt = β0 + β1T + β2Xt + β3XtT + β4T
2 +
∑
k
µkZkt + t (3)
Comparing coefficients from ITSA according to Equation (1) to coefficients in Table
6, one shouldn’t find significant results in the latter if the specifications were right from
the beginning.
Using data from food products manufacturing industries, the employment coefficient
indicating a short-term effect of the treatment β3 wasn’t found to be statistically signifi-
cant. Long-term indicator, β1+β3, was significant. Similar results were produced by the
data from the beverages manufacturing sector, retail trade sales and national unemploy-
ment. In wholesale trade employment data, after including a quadratic time trend, a
significant intercept change coefficient was found but no significant post-tax trend.
In a similar manner, a cubic time trend specification has been tested for. In Table
6, the third column to the right adds a quadratic and a cubic term to the original ITSA
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equation according to :
Yt = β0 + β1T + β2Xt + β3XtT + β4T
2 + β5T
3 +
∑
k
µkZkt + t (4)
The findings of that regression include post-tax trend coefficients that are statistically
significant for all of the data about the employment except for wholesale trade. The fact
that altering time trend variable results in significant β2 and β3 coefficients is a sign of
that the employment effects found in this paper can be independent of the sugar tax
increase.
6.3 National unemployment
The data on national unemployment has been analysed in order to control for overall
trends in the Norwegian labour market. Statistically significant coefficients of intercept
change or post-tax trend would indicate that some changes were under way in Norway
at the time sugar tax was increased. Most probably these changes can’t be attributed
to a change in sugar tax because of the small number of companies the tax really af-
fects. However, finding significant coefficients in the unemployment analysis can indicate
that the changes on national level could have affected sectors studied in section 5 and
confounded the results.
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Figure 7: Figures showing the registered unemployed in Norway since January
2015.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway.
Figure 7a shows the number of registered unemployed in Norway between January
2015 and September 2018. The data seems to present a seasonality pattern and to
be declining between 2015 and 2017. After January 2018, the number of registered
unemployed seems to be on the rise which corresponds to smaller general employment.
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Using the data on national unemployment and controlling for seasonality and one-year
lagged value, Figure 7b was obtained. The graph shows weakly declining pre-tax time
trend. The vertical line at the thirteen month represents the time at which the treatment,
a higher tax rate on sugar, was implemented. As shown in Figure 7b, the trend in national
unemployment in Norway has been slowly declining before January 2018. Afterwards, an
increasing trend was obtained with ITSA.
Table 5: Estimated changes in national unemployment in Norway since January
2015 (in thousands).
National Unemployment
dependent variable Yt coefficient (95% CI) p-value
intercept β0 48.38612 0.087
(-8.655111;105.4273)
pre-tax trend β1 -1.191713 0.022
(-2.162746;-0.2206791)
intercept change β2 -2.56597 0.176
(-6.518042;1.386102)
post-tax trend change β3 5.433723 0.000
(4.135576;6.73187)
post tax trend β1+ β3 4.2420 0.0003
(2.5866;5.8974)
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway. The model were adjusted for
seasonality and one-year lag of dependent variable.
Table 5 summarises the coefficients obtained with the ITSA regression. The immediate
change after the higher tax was introduced, depicted by the intercept change β2, isn’t
statistically significant, which implies that the there isn’t enough evidence to claim that
the tax change had any short-term effects. At the same time, the post-tax trend and the
change in trends are statistically significant (β1 +β3 and β3 have p-values close to 0.000).
This suggests that there might be some long-term effect the higher sugar tax had on the
national unemployment in Norway. The post-tax trend change was positive, which would
imply that after the sugar tax was increased, national unemployment increased. However,
general unemployment is usually subjected to several economic variables, most of which
were not held constant during the intervention. The long-term change in unemployment
trends ought to be attributed to other national as well as global phenomena or other
omitted variable that the paper was not able to control for. This would confound the
findings section 5. The national unemployment analysis suggests that further studies
with richer data sources should be used to confirm the results from this paper.
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6.4 Potential pitfalls
As evidenced by the results of all the robustness tests, the internal validity of the
findings from this paper is fairly low. Therefore, caution must be taken with regard to
the interpretation of the results in this paper. A number of reasons for the inaccuracy of
the discovered employment effects connected with the increased sugar tax can be listed:
1. The nature of the industry under study. The complexity and size of the industry
studied in this paper pose some challenges to the validity of the results. Food,
beverages and tobacco, a group classified in SIC2007 as a whole, contribute to less
than 2% of the whole Norwegian national output. This was about 53 160 employ-
ees in 2001 or 1.88% of the current labour force. In industrialised economies, the
confectionery sector (including ice cream and chocolate) isn’t as labour intensive as
in developing countries. For example, in Germany, the confectioneries stand for less
than 8% of the food sector compared to the rest of the food industry (BDSI, As-
sociation of the German Confectionery Industries, 2018). Statistics Norway (2019)
reports that in Norwegian economy, the labour force is primarily engaged in human
health and social work activities as well as repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles.
This can be seen clearly in Figure 10 in Appendix B. The very modest size of the
workforce employed by the sugary products industry implies that even a significant
change would only have a negligible effect on sector employment compared the food
sector as a whole. Because of that, the impact of the sugar tax on employment
can be so small that it won’t be possible to distinguish it from other trends in
the overall manufacturing employment data. Even though the data was carefully
chosen to exclude motor vehicles and motorcycles, ITSA could still pick up other,
unobserved changes in SIC2007-classified employment available at Statistics Nor-
way. In countries where the confectionery sector is larger or more labour intensive,
an ITSA employment regression could provide more exact results.
2. The nature of ITSA. The methodology applied in this paper can also contribute
to biased results. Despite being a very useful tool in evaluating national policies,
ITSA can in itself become a source of limitation.
(a) Nature of the control group. ITSA violates experimental design by omitting
control group and instead using pre-intervention trend as a counterfactual
group. An issue connected with that was identified as instrumentation by
Biglan et al. (2000) and poses a threat to the validity of the paper. The
researcher argues that the national policy, having been announced ahead, pre-
conditions the counterfactual group even before the treatment is in place and
thus alters their behaviour, making the pre-intervention trend an unsuitable
counterfactual. If wholesalers and retailers of sugary products expected the
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tax to be in place at a certain point in time, they might have adjusted the
number of employees and sales volume in advance. Norwegian government an-
nounces new budgetary reform before they are implemented so any informed
producer can act upon these expectations, altering their own behaviour and
the subsequent outcomes measured by economists. If that was the case for
sugar tax in Norway after January 2018, the changes shortly before January
2018 in all of the industries presented in Figures 4a, 4b, 6a and 6b would be the
result of expectations of a policy, not the policy itself. The national unemploy-
ment analysis produced significant coefficients in many industries. This could
mean that there is some underlying variable that hasn’t been included into the
regression that also affected employment in several sectors of the Norwegian
economy.
(b) Nature of the intervention. Even though the timing of the new policy was
clearly defined, Biglan et al. (2000) points out that the image of the interven-
tion under study will be blurred if any other policy was implemented at the
same time. Interactions between policies can’t be predicted and it is usually
impossible to control for and isolate the results of one policy from the other.
Since Norway is an active member of the global economy, even international
policy changes such as global sugar farming crisis (compare crisis in 1974) could
confound the results of the domestic intervention. These weren’t controlled for
in the paper due to impracticality and scarcity of resources and time. Looking
at other policies that possibly are more isolated could allow for generalisation
of the results across countries and disciplines. In case of the Norwegian sugar
tax increase generalising the results across countries would probably not be
appropriate.
(c) Regression specifications. In order to achieve high internal validity, a correct
form of the ITSA regression equation must be applied. Robustness test of
the time trend specification didn’t succeed in confirming the significance of
the results. Changing time trend specification of the ITSA equation shouldn’t
produce any significant coefficients if the original assumptions were right. This
wasn’t the case. Perhaps a different set of time specifications should be put
in place while choosing the ITSA regression controls. Performing the analysis
on several larger data sets could be helpful in choosing the true specification
of the time trend.
3. Scarcity of data. Unfortunately, Statistics Norway does not provide data on sugary
products imported into the country. Lack of information on imports can hinder
evaluation of the effect of the higher sugar tax on employment since higher imports
tend to imply substitution effect between domestic and foreign sugary products.
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Controlling for imports can be a way of eliminating some omitted variables in any
of the regressions (Wright et al., 2017). Furthermore, being able to analyse more
customised data can contribute to more accurate results. Guerrero-Lo´pez et al.
(2017a) took advantage of industry surveys conducted with a purpose of being used
in the study. With more detailed statistics on employment in industries with close
ties to sugary products, higher internal validity might be achieved.
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7 Discussion of the results
This part discusses the results shown in previous sections. Statistically significant level
is assumed to be α= 0.05.
No evidence of any significant changes in employment in majority of the relevant in-
dustries connected to sugar tax was found in the results. Wholesale trade sector seemed
to have experienced a small, short-term decrease in employment following the increase
in sugar tax. Beverages manufacturing sector seemed to have experienced some signifi-
cant changes in the post-tax trend which can be a sign of long-term effects of the tax.
This result produced with the data on wholesale trade sector seem to confirm partly the
theoretical framework presented in section 2. Surprisingly though, the results obtained
from beverages sector data go against the economic theory. This can be plausible due
to a number of reasons. First, if a large number of beverages rely on added sugar to a
lesser degree, then beverages manufacturing sector won’t react strongly to an increase
in the sugar tax. Secondly, the data on summer 2018 may confound the results of the
post-treatment analysis. Data on employment after the sugar tax was raised consists
of only three quarters, as compared to eight quarters of data before the tax was made
higher. Summer of 2018 was extremely long and hot, creating a natural spur to beverage
sales and thus possibly increasing employment in that sector. The second and third quar-
ter could have acted as outliers, skewing the regression towards higher employment in
the post-treatment period. This haven’t been confirmed by the national unemployment
regression, where post-treatment period exhibited a lower general employment rate. If na-
tionally fewer people were employed after January 2018, the warm summer didn’t change
that trend. Due to data scarcity, information on the effects of summer 2018 couldn’t have
been corrected for in this paper. Perhaps future studies can check for the effect of a good
summer on beverages sector employment. Finally, beverages manufacturers are becom-
ing decreasingly labour-oriented. It can be argued that this sector may be as immune
to the national tax policies changes as similar sectors that rely mostly on capital and
machinery. In such case, increasing employment in beverages sector depends on factors
other than price of inputs, for example on strength of the workers unions and the price
of labour. On the top of that, even if sugar tax did affect production in beverages sector,
the diversification of the products sold by most of the manufacturers could allow for a
smooth absorption of the extra costs by other product lines (Karlsson, 2018).
In other employment sectors, wholesalers and retailers have usually a greater possi-
bility of adjusting their inventories. This would explain the fact that in the long run,
the wholesale trade sector adjusted the number of employed to the pre-intervention level.
Also, the fact that retailers usually diversify their products even more than wholesalers
can make the extra sugar costs dissolve in profits from other firm branches. This can
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cause the effect on the employment in this sectors to be negligible.
8 Conclusion
This paper illustrates the effects a change in the sugar tax in Norway in January
2018 had on employment in different sectors. The evidence suggests that a higher sugar
tax did contribute to a decreased employment in wholesale trade sector. At the same
time, some positive, long-term changes in the employment in the beverage manufacturing
sector were found. A higher sugar tax also corresponds to a significant albeit not large,
positive change in the unemployment statistics. The data from food products and retail
trade sector didn’t produce any evidence of short- or long-term effects of a higher sugar
tax. However, none of the significant employment effects could withstand the robustness
tests which suggests that strong caution must be taken while reading the outcomes of this
ITSA analysis. Further research is required to evaluate the long-term employment effects
of a higher sugar tax in Norway. Including more detailed numbers, data on imports and
money transfers as well as controlling for time trend specifications could further validate
potential research.
In the future, a replication of this paper could conduct an ITSA with more cus-
tomised and more vast data. Perhaps relying on surveys similar to the ones conducted
by Guerrero-Lo´pez et al. (2017a) can provide information that would make the analy-
sis more accurate. Removing some of the possible trends present in less relevant parts
of SIC2007 industrial division could also produce coefficients of higher internal validity.
With more time to work with, statistics on imports of particular food groups could also
be obtained from sources less accessible than Statistics Norway. Adding controls for im-
ports could extract the effect of the treatment in a clearer way. Moreover, if, available,
money transfers records between industrial sectors could also be used to control for the
workforce migration following the introduction of a tax, as suggested by Guerrero-Lo´pez
et al. (2017a).
The robustness tests prove that the time trend in the series might not be linear. A
carefully chosen specification based on a larger amount of empirical data can greatly
add to the internal validity of future results. In addition, Linden (2018) suggests using
permutations as a robustness check that further improves causal inference in ITSA. Future
work may look into the issue and attempt to use ITSAMATCH package in Stata to
evaluate treatment effects.
Another issue worth looking into can be a comparison of sales close to the Swedish-
Norwegian border directly before and after the tax was increased in 2018. Using the
difference in differences design, a hypothetical study could look at the data from around
the region where cross-border substitution effect is the largest. Compared to the parts
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of Norway that are located far away from relatively cheaper Swedish sugary products,
before and after employment might differ. In this way, additional information on the
significance of health taxes for border trade could be obtained.
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(a) Correlogram showing autocorrelation of
data on employment in food products manu-
facturing.
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(b) Correlogram showing autocorrelation of
data on employment in beverages manufactur-
ing.
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(c) Correlogram showing autocorrelation of
data on employment in wholesale trade (ex-
cluding motor vehicles and motorcycles).
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(d) Correlogram showing autocorrelation of
data on employment in retail trade (excluding
motor vehicles and motorcycles).
Figure 8: Correlograms showing lag in data for different employment sectors in Norway
since January 2016.
Source: author’s’ estimations done using data from Statistics Norway. All the correlograms were con-
structed using ac command in Stata 13.
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Figure 9: Correlogram showing lag in data for national unemployment in Norway since
January 2015.
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway. The graph was constructed using
ac command in Stata 13.
B Labour employment by sector
Figure 10: A staple diagram showing the statistics on labour force in Norway by sector
between January 2014 and October 2018.
Source: data from Statistics Norway.
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C Robustness test
Table 6: Robustness test of the ITSA conducted on increased sugar tax in Norway in
January 2018.
Pseudo-intervention a year before (1) Quadratic specification (3) Cubic specification (4)
employment in food sector coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value
intercept β0 46191.21 0.000 45965.75 0.000 46106.58 0.000
(45763.5;46618.91) (45577.29 46354.21) (45984.08;46229.08)
pre-tax trend β1 -48.91176 0.465 -104.35 0.253 -678.5167 0.025
(-217.1706;119.3471) ( -339.8116;131.1116) (-1151.138;-205.8951)
intercept change β2 384.0882 0.090 -287.1 0.175 362.9 0.111
(-94.29247;862.4689) (-803.7848;229.5848) (-206.0415;931.8415)
post-tax trend change β3 129.2059 0.128 -383.8 0.036 461.2 0.101
(-58.36316;316.7749) (-719.8159;-47.78414) (-223.1509;1145.551)
post-tax trend β1 + β3 80.2941 0.0471 -488.1500 0.0605 -217.3167 0.0754
(1.6479;158.9404) (-1.02e+03;40.0738) (-489.7964;55.1630)
employment in beverages sector coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value
intercept β0 3469.574 0.000 3481.375 0.000 3498.528 0.000
(3362.459;3576.688) (3409.88;3552.87) (3446.837;3550.219)
pre-tax trend β1 -15.89706 0.426 -7.675 0.517 -77.60556 0.151
(-65.77533;33.98121) (-41.00274;25.65274) (-224.6326;69.42151)
intercept change β2 -27.14706 0.567 -1.3 0.966 77.86667 0.217
(-147.9948;93.70071) (-90.11427;87.51427) (-110.3698;266.1031)
post-tax trend change β3 1.323529 0.952 73.35 0.026 176.2667 0.068
(-56.38335;59.03041) (16.91287;129.7871) (-31.96142;384.4948)
post-tax trend β1 + β3 -14.5735 0.0757 65.6750 0.0841 98.6611 0.0272
(-31.5506;2.4035) (-16.3662;147.7162) (27.2176;170.1047)
employment in wholesale trade coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value
intercept β0 102493.4 0.000 101233.5 0.000 101438.7 0.000
(100993.9;103992.8) (99705.47;102761.5) (99094.18;103783.3)
pre-tax trend β1 -368.2377 0.105 -328.8 0.260 -1165.513 0.497
(-858.5433;122.0678) (-1083.194;425.5937) (-7250.851;4919.825)
intercept change β2 1900.804 0.021 -1737.133 0.061 -789.9111 0.687
(468.7168;3332.891) (-3628.507;154.2406) (-8076.23;6496.408)
post-tax trend change β3 458.2647 0.077 -887.9 0.087 343.4889 0.876
(-79.96029;996.4897) ( 99705.47102761.5) (-7990.282;8677.26)
post-tax trend β1 + β3 90.0270 0.2752 -1.22e+03 0.1073 -822.0241 0.3448
(-107.8944;287.9483) (-2.92e+03;484.3680) (-3.71e+03;2061.3926)
employment in retail trade sector coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value
intercept β0 198780.2 0.000 199315.3 0.000 199696.2 0.000
(197896.6;199663.8) (198718;199912.5) (197684;201708.4)
pre-tax trend β1 390.6471 0.049 629.05 0.025 -924.1444 0.531
(3.797414;777.4967) (152.8427;1105.257) (-6222.955;4374.666)
intercept change β2 -931.8529 0.060 878.3 0.164 2636.633 0.226
( -1926.894;63.18789) (-647.562;2404.163) (-3916.417;9189.683)
post-tax trend change β3 -588.3235 0.012 728.9 0.105 3014.733 0.219
( -959.9593;-216.6878) (-280.9254;1738.725) (-4321.146;10350.61)
post-tax trend β1 + β3 -197.6765 0.0154 1357.9500 0.0409 2090.5889 0.0686
(-332.9800;-62.3729) (105.7936;2610.1064) (-394.9382;4576.1159)
national unemployment coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value coefficient 95% CI p-value
intercept β0 59.85913 0.460 113.5168 0.000 109.4237 0.000
(-58.36316;316.7749) (105.9432;21.0904) ( 100.1303;118.7171)
pre-tax trend β1 -0.7013831 0.699 4.650458 0.201 29.62251 0.027
(-4.930572;3.527806) (-3.46056;12.76148) (5.470709;53.77431)
intercept change β2 -4.854552 0.598 3.037158 0.583 -11.25944 0.038
(-26.1879;16.47879) (-10.28256;16.35688) (-21.51134;-1.007542)
post-tax trend change β3 0.1039076 0.980 11.64791 0.037 -6.664538 0.316
(-9.617837;9.825652) (1.045859;22.24996) (-22.81662;9.487541)
post-tax trend β1 + β3 -0.5975 0.8052 19.1028 0.0205 15.4168 0.0433
(-6.2677;5.0728) (3.9466;34.2591) (0.6439;30.1898)
Source: author’s estimations done using data from Statistics Norway. Robustness models were adjusted
for seasonality and two-year lag of dependent variable. The pseudo-intervention sets January 2017 as a
pseudo-treatment period. ITSA robustness specifications differ from Equation (1) by having quadratic
respective quadratic and cubic time trends included as controls.
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